WHAT ARE SD’S CHANCES OF RECLAIMING LOST LAND? 2

(Continued from last Monday)

IT is a fact, for instance, that when the British asked the Boers who were in charge of the Transvaal to govern the Kingdom of eSwatini on their behalf, they annexed parts of northern KwaZulu-Natal, which was under their control. This included Kosi Bay and Richards Bay, which were part of and belonged to this country. This act of betrayal was a strategic move by the British to deny access to the sea to the Transvaal Boers to whom they had ceded the administration of this country.

But the crucial question ought to be that given this historical perspective is the BRC’s mission feasible or is it mission impossible. The BRC in its interaction with the media quoted a number of African Union conventions supporting the kingdom’s claim to the lost territories.
What it did not bring to the fore though is the United Nations convention, inherited from its predecessor the League of Nations, on the same subject which, if I recall well, firmly shut the door to any post-independence claims to land or territorial border adjustments by any country to avoid potential conflicts. This convention affirmed the recognition of international territorial borders of nations at independence as official. 

In the event, the Kingdom of eSwatini forewent its opportunity to reclaim the land when it sought and accepted independence from Britain. Put differently, the kingdom should have demanded the return of the land prior to independence in 1968. Had that happened, the British should have been in the forefront of ensuring that the land was returned to restore the order that was when the country sought and earned Britain’s protection. The British diplomatic note would have been relevant then but certainly not now. In fact, it is a historical miscarriage that the Kingdom of eSwatini pre-empted independence negotiations when it had never been colonised per se but was a protectorate, meaning this was a voluntary suspension and not abdication of its independence and sovereignty.

As I see it, at this point in history possibly the one and only way the BRC’s mission can succeed is through the benevolence of the two neighbouring states, South Africa and Mozambique. But even this could be complicated by the people living on the affected territories who, given the contradictory governing systems between the Kingdom of eSwatini, on the one hand, and South Africa and Mozambique, on the other hand, may be reluctant to either come under the governance of the kingdom or to be resettled elsewhere, as was established during the era of homelands when Mpumalanga Province, then KaNgwane Homeland, wherein the people (predominantly Swazi) there in a mini-plebiscite vehemently opposed incorporation into the Kingdom of eSwatini. Conversely, they cheekily suggested it should be the Kingdom of eSwatini that ought to be incorporated into South Africa.

The argument that people do not form part of the agenda since the issue about land is spurious. The fact that South African Swazis still pay homage to the iNgwenyama and still attend local cultural and traditional events as well as host same is acknowledgement of their roots and history of once having been a part of a greater Swazi territory. In the event they have ownership of the land of their forefather and would not easily want to be resettled elsewhere so that the land in question can be incorporated back into the kingdom. In fact, this posture could well alienate Swazis in South Africa from the local leadership, a development that would not be beneficial.

Also, the benevolence of the two neighbouring countries’ governments in readily surrendering the land in question by resettling people resident on this land elsewhere that I alluded to earlier may not be so easy to accomplish too. Empirical evidence of this is the violent flare-up in a place known as Vuwani that was triggered by the government’s decision to transfer the governance and administration of that area to a newly-established local government structure to which the people were and remain violently opposed.

And here we are merely talking about structural changes in the governance and administration of an area and not resettlement of people, which is a far serious issue that would most probably be accompanied by unfathomable collateral damages. 

Additionally, there are also international conventions that speak to the issues of people and land that cannot be ignored in the event the two governments of our neighbouring two countries decided to be benevolent and give up the land claimed by the kingdom. These conventions would be central in informing the two governments in the event they decided, in the remote possibility, to resettle those people presently in occupation of the lands in question who did not want to be incorporated into the Kingdom of eSwatini.  Perhaps the issue that should be on the table is that of reparations and possible dividends accruing from farming and minerals being exploited from the lands in question instead of trying to get back the lands that once formed part of a greater Kingdom of eSwatini.              

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