Last week the country received a consignment of five immigrants from the US, following what the government of Eswatini terms ‘rigorous negotiations and due diligence’. Earlier this month, Eswatini quietly entered the global spotlight as five convicted individuals were repatriated from the United States. To this point, not much is known about the nature of the arrangement and no details have been released either by Washington or Hospital Hill.
All we got while analysing tweets coming out of Washington was ‘adios’, while Hospital Hill tweeted ‘welcome’ through a press statement meant to ally the nation’s fears. The true nature of the arrangement is not known to the public and all we can do at best is to speculate. I am, however, not going to speculate, but rather I am going to give a normative cost-benefit piece on what third country immigrants programmes entail.
New diplomacy?
This isn’t an isolated case. South Sudan recently accepted eight prisoners from the US, despite most having no ties to the country. Meanwhile, Rwanda is in active negotiations with the US to receive migrants, following a similar—though controversial—deal with the United Kingdom. These examples offer a blueprint for understanding the economic rationale behind such arrangements.
Lessons from Rwanda, S. Sudan
South Sudan’s acceptance of eight US immigrants – some convicted of violent crimes, was facilitated after a legal battle that reached the US Supreme Court. The country’s cooperation, despite internal instability and limited resources, suggests that such transfers may be part of broader diplomatic negotiations, potentially linked to aid or infrastructure support.
Rwanda’s case is even more instructive. In 2022, the UK agreed to pay £370 million into Rwanda’s Economic Transformation and Integration Fund, plus £171 000 per person relocated, to support a five-year integration package. Although the plan was ultimately scrapped, Rwanda retained £240 million in payments. Now, Rwanda is negotiating a similar deal with the US, which may include stipends and job assistance for immigrants, funded by Washington.
These examples highlight a key point: Countries that accept deportees can negotiate substantial economic benefits, including development funding, infrastructure investment and capacity-building support.
Economic benefits to Eswatini
The one universal truth is ‘there is no free lunch’, the father of economics Adam smith is famous for these words”: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”
The question that begs an answer is how much are we getting or rather what is in it for us? In the absence of proper data and communication out of Washington and Hospital Hill, I will present a normative analysis of what we stand to lose or gain.
The country stands to unlock notable economic benefits by framing US prisoner transfers not merely as humanitarian cooperation, but as a strategic diplomatic tool. By accepting immigrants, the country can negotiate co-financing arrangements for upgrading Correctional infrastructure, securing technical support for rehabilitation programmes and expanding partnerships that improve public service delivery.
More critically, Eswatini’s willingness to collaborate may enhance its standing with the United States at a pivotal time – especially as the nation enters into trade negotiations aimed at expanding market access, development financing (PEPFAR), and preferential terms under initiatives like AGOA or emerging bilateral agreements.
When managed astutely, such cooperation could be leveraged to secure infrastructure aid, capacity-building investments and favourable positioning in broader economic dialogues, transforming what may appear as a fiscal burden into a catalyst for development.
If we play the long game, we can likely have better trading arrangements with US. We know that China has granted all other African countries except Eswatini zero tariff access to the Chinese market. Eswatini needs to curry favour with the US to expand her output into the world’s biggest economy considering that entry into the world’s second largest economy is blocked due to our alignment with the Republic of China on Taiwan.
Eswatini’s Correctional system, like many across Sub-Saharan Africa, operates within significant budgetary constraints. Based on historical data, the average annual cost of incarceration per inmate in 2008 was E35 864.39. Adjusted for inflation and expanded service demands, the 2025 estimate now ranges between E5 500 and E5 800 per month per prisoner.
For the five prisoners recently transferred from the United States, this translates to an annual fiscal burden of E330 000 to E348 000. These exclude diplomatic mission to get the persons back in their countries of origin. Public investment in education, healthcare and infrastructure remains stretched, kingdom. Absorbing foreign prisoners without compensation raises critical questions about opportunity cost, local development foregone to absorb the prisoners.
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